Document the second pass and what is still open

DESIGN.md

@@ -111,6 +111,29 @@ capability.
 Codes are single-use, stored as a hash rather than plaintext, use an alphabet
 with no `0/O` or `1/I`, and tolerate the dash being dropped when retyped.
 
+### A human session is not constructible by hand
+
+`issue_view_session` takes a `GrantedCode`, not an agent name. `GrantedCode`'s
+constructor raises; the only way to hold one is to have redeemed a code, so the
+scopes on a human session are always the ones the issuer allowed and always the
+ones a redemption path was walked to get. There is no in-process shortcut, which
+means a future route cannot pass a string where a proof belongs.
+
+### Suspension is not death
+
+`revoke <agent>` with no end time is permanent: the identity is dead until
+someone re-enrols it. `revoke <agent> --until <unix>` is a pause, and it lapses
+on its own.
+
+The distinction matters because the two failure modes are different. A key
+compromise wants death — a lapsing revocation would hand the attacker back in
+when the timer ran out, which is a revocation that silently fails at exactly the
+wrong moment. A noisy neighbour or a holiday wants a pause, and re-enrolling for
+that would destroy the audit history that says it was deliberate.
+
+Revoking kills live sessions and drops outstanding challenges, so a revocation
+that races an in-flight authentication cannot be overtaken by it.
+
 ### Existing controls stay
 
 Per the decision taken: **existing human controls are unchanged.** Quill and
@@ -157,35 +180,58 @@ enrolment, challenge, verification, code issuance, redemption, refusal and
 revocation, with actor, subject and key fingerprint.
 
 Each row folds in the previous row's digest, so editing or deleting an event
-breaks every digest after it, and `verify_chain` reports the first bad id. That
-makes tampering *detectable*. It does not make it *impossible*: an attacker with
-write access to the database can recompute the chain, because the digests are
-unkeyed. To commit to a log you need the head digest anchored outside the
-database's reach, or signed. Worth doing when the attestations start mattering,
-not before.
+breaks every digest after it, and `verify_chain` reports the first bad id.
+
+That alone makes tampering *detectable* but not *impossible*: an attacker with
+write access to the database can recompute every digest, because they are
+unkeyed. The tested version of that attack is a database attacker who deletes
+history, forges replacements, and rebuilds the chain — `verify_chain` passes.
+
+So the head digest also gets **signed checkpoints**, by an enrolled agent whose
+private key the database does not contain. `verify-chain` runs both checks, and
+the rewrite is caught by the signature the attacker cannot produce. A forged
+checkpoint fails signature verification, a checkpoint from a stranger is refused
+at signing time, and a rekey invalidates every earlier checkpoint — which is
+correct, and says so rather than failing quietly.
+
+What this still does not do is survive an attacker who can also delete the
+checkpoints, because they live in the same database. Real deployment anchors the
+head digest somewhere the database cannot reach. This narrows the attack from
+"rewrite anything" to "erase the record that you did", and leaves that second
+half open.
 
 Secrets are not in the log and not in the database in the clear. Codes and
 session tokens are stored as digests, enrolment secrets are hashed and spent
-once. So a stolen database yields no live credential — which is only true
+once. The log refers to credentials by truncated digest too, never by prefix: a
+code is 8 characters from a 32-character alphabet, so the first four left about
+20 bits, and the audit log is the artifact most likely to be exported or shared. So a stolen database yields no live credential — which is only true
 because the review looked for it.
 
 ## Status
 
-80 passing tests, and a hardening pass that closed real defects. The worst were
+106 passing tests, and two hardening passes that closed real defects. The worst were
 concurrency: one-time codes were redeemable repeatedly (753 sessions from 200
 codes under load), and a bootstrap secret could enrol more than one key. Those
 are now atomic compare-and-set operations, each covered by a test that races
 twelve threads. Session tokens are stored hashed, keys can be encrypted,
 challenge issuance is rate limited, rekey revokes old sessions, and the log is
-hash-chained.
+hash-chained with signed checkpoints.
+
+The second pass closed: credentials leaking into the log as prefixes, human
+sessions mintable from a bare agent name, no revocation operation at all, an
+unkeyed chain that a database-level attacker could rebuild, and SQLite without
+a busy timeout.
 
 **Still not production ready**, and the reason is not a to-do list:
 
-- **No independent review.** Everything above is self-review. Self-review finds
-  the bugs you already suspected. This needs someone else.
-- **The chain is unkeyed** — detectable, not tamper-proof (see *Audit trail*).
+- **No independent review.** Everything above is self-review, twice over.
+  Self-review finds the bugs you already suspected. This needs someone else,
+  ideally a cryptographer, and it is the one blocker code cannot close.
+- **Checkpoints are not anchored off-box.** Signed, yes; deleteable by the same
+  attacker along with everything else, yes. See *Audit trail*.
 - **The service is unwritten.** TLS, CSRF, transport, secret storage, routes.
-- **Revocation has no expiry semantics**, and there is no key recovery.
+- **Rate limits are per-process**, so N processes means N times the quota.
+- **No key recovery.** Rotate and old sessions die. Deliberate.
 - **Humans remain unattributable** to themselves, which is accepted and is a
   cost, not an oversight.
 
@@ -193,9 +239,11 @@ The tests show the logic is correct. They do not make it safe.
 
 ## Next
 
-1. Independent security review before this guards anything real. The hardening
-   pass made it reviewable; it did not substitute for one.
-2. Secret broker on top — scoped, short-lived leases bound to a key fingerprint.
+1. Independent security review before this guards anything real. Two hardening
+   passes made it reviewable; neither substituted for one.
+2. Anchor the checkpoint head digest outside the database, so deleting the
+   checkpoints stops being an option for an attacker who already has the file.
+3. Secret broker on top — scoped, short-lived leases bound to a key fingerprint.
    Its issuance and redemption logs *are* the work-attestation substrate, so it
    is the natural second piece.
-3. Deprecate passcode login across the platform, then rotate live credentials.
+4. Deprecate passcode login across the platform, then rotate live credentials.