diff --git a/DESIGN.md b/DESIGN.md
index 7bed094..040948d 100644
--- a/DESIGN.md
+++ b/DESIGN.md
@@ -152,23 +152,49 @@ it needs a human identity model of its own, which is a separate piece of work.
 
 ## Audit trail
 
-Append-only, and the raw material for signed work attestations: every
+Hash-chained, and the raw material for signed work attestations: every
 enrolment, challenge, verification, code issuance, redemption, refusal and
-revocation, with actor, subject and key fingerprint. Code hashes are stored,
-never codes; enrolment secrets are hashed and deleted on use, so a database
-leak yields neither.
+revocation, with actor, subject and key fingerprint.
+
+Each row folds in the previous row's digest, so editing or deleting an event
+breaks every digest after it, and `verify_chain` reports the first bad id. That
+makes tampering *detectable*. It does not make it *impossible*: an attacker with
+write access to the database can recompute the chain, because the digests are
+unkeyed. To commit to a log you need the head digest anchored outside the
+database's reach, or signed. Worth doing when the attestations start mattering,
+not before.
+
+Secrets are not in the log and not in the database in the clear. Codes and
+session tokens are stored as digests, enrolment secrets are hashed and spent
+once. So a stolen database yields no live credential — which is only true
+because the review looked for it.
 
 ## Status
 
-Working reference implementation with 54 passing tests. **Not production ready,
-and not reviewed.** Specifically missing: independent cryptographic review,
-encryption at rest, rate limiting on challenge issuance, agent revocation
-expiry, and transport assumptions. The tests show the logic is correct; they do
-not make it safe.
+80 passing tests, and a hardening pass that closed real defects. The worst were
+concurrency: one-time codes were redeemable repeatedly (753 sessions from 200
+codes under load), and a bootstrap secret could enrol more than one key. Those
+are now atomic compare-and-set operations, each covered by a test that races
+twelve threads. Session tokens are stored hashed, keys can be encrypted,
+challenge issuance is rate limited, rekey revokes old sessions, and the log is
+hash-chained.
+
+**Still not production ready**, and the reason is not a to-do list:
+
+- **No independent review.** Everything above is self-review. Self-review finds
+  the bugs you already suspected. This needs someone else.
+- **The chain is unkeyed** — detectable, not tamper-proof (see *Audit trail*).
+- **The service is unwritten.** TLS, CSRF, transport, secret storage, routes.
+- **Revocation has no expiry semantics**, and there is no key recovery.
+- **Humans remain unattributable** to themselves, which is accepted and is a
+  cost, not an oversight.
+
+The tests show the logic is correct. They do not make it safe.
 
 ## Next
 
-1. Independent security review before this guards anything real.
+1. Independent security review before this guards anything real. The hardening
+   pass made it reviewable; it did not substitute for one.
 2. Secret broker on top — scoped, short-lived leases bound to a key fingerprint.
    Its issuance and redemption logs *are* the work-attestation substrate, so it
    is the natural second piece.