Harden Sigil: README.md

README.md

@@ -11,8 +11,8 @@ a passcode      is the identity     -> can be copied, leaked in a URL, replayed
 a signature      proves the identity -> cannot be forged, cannot be replayed
 ```
 
-This is a working reference implementation with tests. It is **not hardened for
+This is a working implementation with tests and a hardening pass behind it. It
-production** — see *Status* below.
+is **not independently reviewed** — see *Status* below.
 
 ## What it does
 
@@ -31,15 +31,17 @@ export SIGIL_DB=/tmp/demo.db
 
 python3 sigil.py seed bigpickle                       # -> one-time secret
 python3 sigil.py keygen /tmp/demo.key                 # -> public_b64, fingerprint
+                                                      #    add a passphrase to encrypt
 python3 sigil.py enrol bigpickle "$PUB" "$SECRET"     # bind key, consume secret
 python3 sigil.py challenge bigpickle                  # -> nonce
 python3 sigil.py sign /tmp/demo.key "$NONCE"          # -> signature
 python3 sigil.py verify "$NONCE" "$SIG"               # -> agent session token
 
-python3 sigil.py code bigpickle                       # hand a human a code
+python3 sigil.py code bigpickle /tmp/demo.key         # hand a human a code
 python3 sigil.py redeem X3ZB-NTLG                     # -> human_via_agent token
 python3 sigil.py whoami "$TOKEN"                      # kind, scopes, may_act_as_agent
 python3 sigil.py events bigpickle                     # audit trail
+python3 sigil.py verify-chain                         # is the log intact?
 ```
 
 ## Tests
@@ -48,9 +50,10 @@ python3 sigil.py events bigpickle                     # audit trail
 python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -v
 ```
 
-54 tests. They cover the refusals, not just the happy paths: replayed
+80 tests. They cover the refusals, not just the happy paths: replayed
 signatures, wrong keys, expired nonces, single-use codes, scope escalation, and
-the invariant below.
+the invariant below. `test_hardening.py` has one test per defect found in
+review, so any of them regressing brings that defect back.
 
 ## The invariant
 
@@ -76,21 +79,51 @@ session. Scopes come from the issuer and never widen with time. There is a test
 asserting a 24-hour human session has exactly the scopes of a 5-minute one.
 
 **Code lifetime ≠ session lifetime.** A code is a key and expires in 5 minutes.
-The session it opens lasts an hour. The code travels in chat, so it is made
+The session it opens lasts an hour, counted **from redemption**. The code
-worthless fast; the hour buys reading comfort and no extra capability.
+travels in chat, so it is made worthless fast; the hour buys reading comfort and
+no extra capability. Waiting for a code does not eat into it — an earlier draft
+anchored the session to issue time, which quietly handed out less than promised.
+
+**Nothing is minted from a name.** `issue_code` takes an agent *session*, not an
+agent id, and `verify_chain` exists so tampering is detectable. A function that
+accepts a string and returns authority is how "who is this?" quietly becomes
+unanswerable.
 
 ## Status
 
-Reference implementation. Deliberately not yet:
+A hardening pass closed the defects below. Each is now covered by a test.
 
-- **Reviewed by anyone.** This is security-critical code. It needs an
+| Found in review | Now |
-  independent cryptographic review before it guards anything real.
+|---|---|
-- **Hardened at rest.** Keys and DB are stored unencrypted; the private key file
+| `issue_code()` trusted an agent name, so it minted authority from a string | Takes an agent session; agent derived from it |
-  is `0600` but that is all.
+| One-time code redeemable many times in a race (753 times in 200 trials) | Atomic compare-and-set; 300 races, one success each |
-- **Rate limited.** `challenge` is unmetered, so brute-force and
+| Bootstrap secret spendable more than once | Atomic compare-and-set |
-  nonce-exhaustion are open.
+| Signed nonce verifiable more than once | Nonce claimed before the signature is judged |
-- **Transport.** No TLS concerns addressed; assumes a trusted channel.
+| Session tokens stored in clear | Stored as SHA-256 digests, like codes |
-- **Agent revocation** exists but has no expiry semantics.
+| Audit log editable and deletable in place | Hash-chained; `verify_chain` names the first bad event |
+| `challenge` unmetered | Sliding-window limits per agent on every entry point |
+| Private keys written unencrypted | Optional passphrase (PBKDF2, AES-256), `0600` |
+| Rekey left old sessions alive | Rekey revokes every session for that agent |
+| Agent ids unvalidated, could forge log lines | Constrained alphabet and length |
+| 1-hour session anchored to issue time | Anchored to redemption |
+
+Still open, and these are the reasons not to ship it yet:
+
+- **No independent review.** Everything above is self-review. Self-review finds
+  the bugs you thought of. It does not find the ones you did not. This needs
+  someone else, ideally a cryptographer, before it guards anything real.
+- **The chain is unkeyed.** Each event folds in the previous digest, so an
+  accidental edit or deletion is caught. An attacker with write access to the
+  database can recompute the chain. For a real commitment, checkpoint the head
+  digest somewhere the database cannot reach, or sign it.
+- **The service around this is unwritten.** TLS, CSRF, session transport, secret
+  storage and the HTTP routes are not here. The library refuses to mint
+  authority from a name; a route that forgets to pass a session still cannot,
+  but that is only as good as the integration.
+- **Revocation has no expiry semantics.** Revoking works; scheduled or
+  self-expiring revocation does not.
+- **No key recovery.** Rotate and you lose the old sessions. There is no escrow,
+  which is a deliberate choice, not an oversight.
 
 The tests assert the logic is correct. They do not make it safe.