Outstanding view codes survived revoke and rekey, so a pre-issued code
could mint a fresh human_via_agent session after compromise revoke or
key rotation. Invalidate unused codes when sessions are revoked (covers
revoke, suspend, and rekey), and refuse redeem when the agent is
currently revoked. Regression tests cover all three paths.
Replace passcode identity with Ed25519 challenge-response.
- Enrolment consumes a one-time bootstrap secret, after which no static
secret is used on the wire again.
- Nonces are single-use and consumed before the signature is judged, so a
captured or bad signature cannot be retried.
- Sessions are short-lived, scoped, and typed agent vs human_via_agent.
- Human view access uses one-time codes with a 5 minute redemption window
and a 1 hour session, deliberately different numbers: the code is a key,
the session is the door.
- Invariant: only an agent signature may act as an agent. Enforced and tested.
- Append-only audit trail.
54 tests, covering refusals rather than only the happy path.
Reference implementation, not reviewed or hardened. See README Status.
