DESIGN.md

@@ -241,7 +241,8 @@ Leora's contracted prod pass (Quarry 18a5d762) closed three remaining review blo
   rewrite that in-DB checkpoints alone would miss after deletion. Leave it unset
   and the tip stays in-DB only.
 - **The service is unwritten.** TLS, CSRF, transport, routes. DB file seal is
-  available (`SealedStore`); SQLCipher page-level encryption is not.
+  available (`SealedStore`, plaintext working copy `0600`); SQLCipher
+  page-level encryption is deferred (not yet available).
 - **Rate limits are per-process**, so N processes means N times the quota.
 - **No key recovery.** Rotate and old sessions die. Deliberate.
 - **Humans remain unattributable** to themselves, which is accepted and is a

README.md

@@ -137,7 +137,9 @@ Still open, and these are the reasons not to ship it yet:
 - **The service around this is unwritten.** TLS, CSRF, session transport and the
   HTTP routes. DB encryption at rest is available via `SealedStore` /
   `SIGIL_SEAL_PASS` (AES-256-GCM file seal; not SQLCipher page-level). The
-  library refuses to mint authority from a name, so a route that forgets to
+  plaintext working copy is mode `0600` in a private temp dir while open;
+  SQLCipher remains deferred for hostile co-resident hosts. The library
+  refuses to mint authority from a name, so a route that forgets to
   authenticate fails closed, but that is only as good as the integration.
 - **Off-box anchor is opt-in.** Set `SIGIL_ANCHOR` (or `Store(..., anchor_path=)`)
   and every checkpoint also writes a signed tip outside the SQLite file.

sigil/sealed.py

@@ -11,6 +11,11 @@ working copy is plaintext in memory / a temp file while open). It is a real
 working seal: the file on disk is ciphertext, and tests assert a stolen seal
 has no SQLite header and no recoverable agent rows without the passphrase.
 
+The plaintext working copy is created mode 0600 inside a private temp dir.
+SQLCipher (or equivalent page-level encryption) remains a deferred prod
+follow-up for multi-tenant / hostile co-resident hosts — never treat seal-on
+as "encrypted DB" while the process is running.
+
 Format on disk (version 1):
 
     b"SIGILSEAL1" + 16-byte salt + 12-byte nonce + AESGCM(ciphertext)
@@ -83,6 +88,30 @@ def is_sealed_file(path: str) -> bool:
         return handle.read(len(MAGIC)) == MAGIC
 
 
+def _write_private_file(path: str, data: bytes) -> None:
+    """Write `data` to `path` with mode 0600, fsync, unlink on failure."""
+    flags = os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_TRUNC
+    fd = os.open(path, flags, 0o600)
+    try:
+        with os.fdopen(fd, "wb") as handle:
+            fd = -1  # ownership transferred
+            handle.write(data)
+            handle.flush()
+            os.fsync(handle.fileno())
+        os.chmod(path, 0o600)
+    except Exception:
+        if fd >= 0:
+            try:
+                os.close(fd)
+            except OSError:
+                pass
+        try:
+            os.unlink(path)
+        except OSError:
+            pass
+        raise
+
+
 class SealedStore(Store):
     """Store whose on-disk file is AES-GCM sealed.
 
@@ -107,6 +136,8 @@ class SealedStore(Store):
         self.seal_path = path
         self._passphrase = passphrase
         self._tmpdir = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="sigil-seal-")
+        # TemporaryDirectory is already 0700; pin the dir mode explicitly.
+        os.chmod(self._tmpdir.name, 0o700)
         self._plain_path = os.path.join(self._tmpdir.name, "store.db")
         if os.path.exists(path):
             with open(path, "rb") as handle:
@@ -117,9 +148,16 @@ class SealedStore(Store):
                     "refusing to treat a cleartext DB as sealed"
                 )
             plain = unseal_bytes(blob, passphrase)
-            with open(self._plain_path, "wb") as handle:
+            _write_private_file(self._plain_path, plain)
-                handle.write(plain)
+        else:
+            # Touch an empty 0600 file so SQLite does not create a world-readable DB.
+            _write_private_file(self._plain_path, b"")
         super().__init__(self._plain_path, anchor_path=anchor_path)
+        # Re-pin after SQLite open (WAL/SHM sidecars inherit umask otherwise).
+        try:
+            os.chmod(self._plain_path, 0o600)
+        except OSError:
+            pass
 
     def flush(self) -> str:
         """Checkpoint WAL, read plaintext bytes, write sealed blob to seal_path."""
@@ -130,14 +168,24 @@ class SealedStore(Store):
             dest_path = os.path.join(self._tmpdir.name, "export.db")
             if os.path.exists(dest_path):
                 os.unlink(dest_path)
+            # Pre-create 0600 so SQLite backup does not leave a world-readable export.
+            _write_private_file(dest_path, b"")
             dest = sqlite3.connect(dest_path)
             try:
                 self.conn.backup(dest)
                 dest.commit()
             finally:
                 dest.close()
+            try:
+                os.chmod(dest_path, 0o600)
+            except OSError:
+                pass
             with open(dest_path, "rb") as handle:
                 plain = handle.read()
+            try:
+                os.unlink(dest_path)
+            except OSError:
+                pass
             blob = seal_bytes(plain, self._passphrase)
             directory = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(self.seal_path))
             if directory:

tests/test_sealed.py

@@ -124,3 +124,30 @@ class TestSealedStore(unittest.TestCase):
 
 if __name__ == "__main__":
     unittest.main()
+
+
+class TestPlaintextWorkingCopyHardening(unittest.TestCase):
+    """R5: plaintext tmp must be 0600; SQLCipher remains deferred."""
+
+    def test_plaintext_working_copy_is_owner_only(self):
+        import tempfile
+        from sigil.sealed import SealedStore
+        from sigil import identity, keys
+
+        d = tempfile.mkdtemp()
+        path = os.path.join(d, "sealed.db")
+        store = SealedStore(path, "test-passphrase-ok")
+        try:
+            mode = os.stat(store._plain_path).st_mode & 0o777
+            self.assertEqual(mode, 0o600, oct(mode))
+            dir_mode = os.stat(store._tmpdir.name).st_mode & 0o777
+            self.assertEqual(dir_mode, 0o700, oct(dir_mode))
+            secret = identity.seed_bootstrap(store, "alice")
+            _, pub = keys.generate()
+            identity.enrol(store, "alice", keys.export_public_b64(pub), secret)
+            store.flush()
+            # export.db must not linger world-readable after flush
+            export = os.path.join(store._tmpdir.name, "export.db")
+            self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(export))
+        finally:
+            store.close()