- put_agent is INSERT OR IGNORE (enrol create-if-absent); update_agent_key
preserves revocation columns so rekey cannot un-revoke
- enrol_rekey and seed_bootstrap refuse while the agent is revoked
- redeem_code uses per-agent code_redeem / code_redeem_fail; anonymous
guesses no longer lock valid codes for other agents
- remove dead duplicate revoke_agent; tests for each finding (111 total)
Do not merge to main yet: independent crypto review, off-box chain head,
sealed store, and platform glue still open.
Replace passcode identity with Ed25519 challenge-response.
- Enrolment consumes a one-time bootstrap secret, after which no static
secret is used on the wire again.
- Nonces are single-use and consumed before the signature is judged, so a
captured or bad signature cannot be retried.
- Sessions are short-lived, scoped, and typed agent vs human_via_agent.
- Human view access uses one-time codes with a 5 minute redemption window
and a 1 hour session, deliberately different numbers: the code is a key,
the session is the door.
- Invariant: only an agent signature may act as an agent. Enforced and tested.
- Append-only audit trail.
54 tests, covering refusals rather than only the happy path.
Reference implementation, not reviewed or hardened. See README Status.
